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Introduction 
In Bioethics, Medicine and the Criminal Law,1 Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost ‘tell a story 
about the ways that the criminal process engages with medicine and bioethics’—a story 
designed to explore and ‘to explain the interaction between the three when they meet in the 
theatre of the courts, the legislature and public opinion’.2  
In fact, Brazier and Ost tell several stories, two of which inspire this paper. The first is a 
story about the use of ‘medicalisation’ (‘compromise medicalisation’ as we will term it) as a 
strategy for dealing with bioethical conflicts that divide communities. So, for example, 
Brazier and Ost present the Abortion Act 1967 in this light;3 and, putting the point more 
generally, they suggest that ‘medicalisation plays a useful if often criticised role in mediating 
between the polarized extremes of bioethical debate…offer[ing] a way forward that is less 
than intellectually first class, but better than the practical alternatives.’4 The second story 
highlights the ‘kindly’5 treatment typically accorded by prosecutors, juries and judges to 
doctors who follow their conscience and try to do the right thing (even when this might fly in 
the face of the law)—for example, ‘doctors who seek to practise compassionately at the end, 
or beginning, of life, [or] who seek to honour their patients’ wishes….’6 
Against the backcloth of these stories, we suggest that, when Parliament introduces a 
measure of ‘compromise medicalisation’, this does more than change the law; crucially, it 
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changes the responsibilities of both doctors and legal actors. Post-enactment, the medical 
profession, as a trusted third-party, is charged with safeguarding the terms of the 
compromise; and, where doctors fail to discharge their new responsibilities, it is quite wrong 
for those legal actors who play a leading role in the theatre of the criminal justice system to 
default to a kindly attitude. 
This chapter is in three main parts. First, we identify three distinct types of 
‘medicalisation’ before specifying the nature of the special responsibilities that go with 
‘compromise medicalisation’. Secondly, looking back at nearly half a century’s experience 
with the explicit statutory medicalisation of abortion, we consider whether there is any 
evidence that doctors are not taking their special responsibilities seriously, and whether the 
key legal actors continue (inappropriately) to treat doctors kindly. Thirdly, learning from the 
experience with abortion, we focus on the possible medicalisation of assisted suicide, as 
proposed recently by Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill (ADB 2014). Our question, in 
short, is whether we can be confident that the medical profession (and, no less importantly, 
the leading legal actors) would hold the legislative line and safeguard the terms of the 
compromise. Or, are opponents of the Bill right to fear that this might be the thin end of an 
unauthorised wedge? 
Our conclusions are as follows. First, our experience in relation to the medicalisation of 
abortion is that the terms of the compromise have not stuck. Secondly, this experience rightly 
gives a cause for concern to those who oppose the Falconer Bill. Thirdly, if ‘compromise 
medicalisation’ is the intended strategy of the Bill, then it needs to be made absolutely clear 
that the medical profession stands in the position of a trusted third party with a special 
responsibility to adhere to the terms of the compromise. Fourthly, because—if the Bill 
succeeds in changing the law—there is a distinct possibility that public opinion in relation to 
the ethics of assisted suicide might also change, there needs to be a strategy for keeping the 
law and practice in alignment with reasonable public views. Fifthly, where the original 
strategy is one of compromise medicalisation, it cannot be the medical profession that has the 
responsibility for keeping the law and practice aligned with public opinion. Finally, if the 
Falconer Bill survives the Parliamentary process, it will be a controversial but legitimate 
development of the law. We suggest that, if the terms of this latest exercise in compromise 
medicalisation are to be modified, a similar process should be engaged—that is to say, a 
process that requires nothing less than a positive act of parliamentary approval; and there 
should certainly be no change in the practice of assisted dying without proper legislative 
authorisation.   
The Special Responsibilities Associated With ‘Compromise Medicalisation’ 
Broadly speaking, the term ‘medicalisation’ signifies that a particular kind of decision or 
procedure is entrusted to the medical profession. However, we can differentiate between three 
particular instances of this phenomenon. First, there is ‘exclusionary medicalisation’. Here, in 
the belief that some decision or procedure is uniquely within the range of expertise of the 
medical profession and that it would be unsafe for other persons to make the decisions or to 
undertake the procedures, we entrust the matter exclusively to the former, excluding those 
who are not members of the profession from making the decisions or undertaking the 
procedures in question.7 Secondly, there is ‘evolutionary medicalisation’, entrusting to the 
medical profession the task of adjusting medical practice so that it, and the law that authorises 
it, aligns with public opinion and reasonable patient needs and expectations. Thirdly, there is 
‘compromise medicalisation’, which entrusts the medical profession with granting patients 
access to an ethically controversial procedure but if, and only if, the terms and conditions set 
by the legislative compromise are satisfied. While there is much to be said about both 
exclusionary and evolutionary medicalisation, in this chapter our interest is in teasing out the 
special responsibilities that attach to ‘compromise medicalisation’. 
To locate ‘compromise medicalisation’ in a larger regulatory context: where communities 
are divided about the ethics of some matter—for example, about the ethics of divorce, or 
using human embryos for medical research, or abortion or euthanasia—a compromise might 
be brokered. Against a restrictive background, a degree of relaxation is introduced. However, 
the permission is subject to carefully specified conditions (a list of approved reasons, 
grounds, purposes, and the like) together with an appropriate process for authorisation by 
independent and accountable persons (whether judges, the members of a regulatory agency, 
or doctors). Ex hypothesi, the medicalisation of such contested issues as abortion and assisted 
suicide is controversial, sensitive, and above all a compromise: for pro-choice advocates, the 
permission will be too narrow; for pro-life advocates, the permission will be too broad.8 
Nevertheless, it is of the essence of democratic politics that the compromise sticks in 
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practice; and, to this end, there are safeguards and limits that operate both ex ante and ex 
post. Ex ante, doctors are required conscientiously and in good faith to assess whether a 
relevant application falls within the terms of the permission; and ex post, they are required to 
report the acts that they have authorised. 
Clearly, post-enactment, it is not for doctors to follow their convictions in the way that 
they might when participating in pre-enactment debates; rather, it is now their (possibly 
unwelcome) responsibility to ensure that the terms of the regulatory compromise are 
faithfully observed.9 To be sure, this might put some doctors in a position that strains their 
commitment to the compromise. Nevertheless, in their ex ante practice, doctors should act in 
a way that is compatible with their position as trusted third parties, neither stretching nor 
squeezing the sphere of legal permission in order to satisfy their pro-choice or pro-life 
inclinations. Similarly, it is important, too, that legal actors are compliant so that, in the event 
that a doctor is found to have wilfully departed from the compromise, the response should be 
to enforce the law. 
Yet, there surely must be some margin for both doctors and judges where they are faced 
with particular cases that expose some lack of clarity in the legislative scheme or that have 
simply not been anticipated.10 Where doctors have in good faith sought to respect the spirit 
and intent of the compromise, a kindly response is appropriate. However, more difficult 
questions are raised where the medical profession takes it upon itself to adjust the 
compromise so as to align it with what is perceived to be changing public opinion. The 
concern is not that doctors might misread public opinion; the point is that, if the scheme is 
one of ‘compromise medicalisation’, doctors simply should not be engaging in this exercise. 
Of course, if the legislation contemplates the profession being entrusted with an 
‘evolutionary’ role, then that is a different matter; this is not ‘compromise medicalisation’ 
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and the profession’s new guidance and practice might well be legitimate. However, in the 
absence of express authorisation, the profession’s licence to act this way might be at best 
implicit (possibly with encouragement from, or at least acquiescence by, the relevant 
government department) and its scope might be uncertain—raising larger questions of 
transparency and accountability that go well beyond the particular interests of the pro-choice 
and pro-life lobbies.11 Moreover, if the standard criminal justice response is to show a kindly 
attitude to those doctors who defend their actions—whether their initial decision or their 
subsequent administration of the relevant procedure or treatment—on the basis that it is 
broadly in line with general practice, then legal actors risk becoming complicit in unlicensed 
adjustment of the compromise.12  
Ex post, it is the special responsibility of doctors to report their authorising actions. 
Reporting is no mere bureaucratic requirement. At a general level, reporting enables the 
impact of the compromise to be monitored13; and it provides an evidence base for any 
tweaking of, or more radical revision to, the compromise.14 At a specific level, reporting 
functions as a prompt for whatever checks and further inquiries need to be made as to the 
propriety of the doctors’ actions. It follows that, even though reporting obligations might be 
viewed as tiresome, they are an important part of the compromise package. As Brazier and 
Ost recognise, these packages might not always be ‘intellectually first class’ but they almost 
always reflect a delicate balance; and it is of the essence of compromise medicalisation that 
the balance—that is to say, the balance struck between the opposed ethical views—is 
maintained. 
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Abortion and ‘Medicalisation’ 
Although the common law recognised that, if a doctor undertook an abortion in good faith for 
the purpose of preserving the life of the mother, then they would not have acted unlawfully,15 
the Abortion Act 1967 reset the framework for lawful terminations in a way that makes it an 
exemplar of ‘compromise medicalisation’.  
At the time of the 1967 Act, there was much that was not anticipated—not least, the 
development of modern abortion techniques16 and the fact that there would be a significant 
change in the delivery mechanism for abortion services (i.e., from NHS to independent sector 
delivery). Most strikingly, in 1967, it would have been absurd to have suggested that the 
legislation licensed ‘abortion on demand’; this would have been a sell-out to the pro-choice 
group and no kind of compromise. At the time, the Act was a hesitant endorsement of ‘the 
position that abortion could be acceptable medical treatment’;17 and, it was recognised that a 
‘great social responsibility’ had been placed by the law ‘on the shoulders of the medical 
profession’.18 Nearly fifty years later, the big picture looks very different; the landscape of 
abortions has been transformed.19 Nowadays, abortions have been normalised; from allowing 
that abortions could be acceptable in limited circumstances, in all but name, abortion on 
demand is available. While it can be argued that practice has simply evolved to reflect 
changes in public opinion,20 and while this might be consistent with ‘evolutionary 
medicalisation’, it is deeply problematic relative to ‘compromise medicalisation’. 
The normalisation of abortion is reflected in many ways, not least in the fact that, since 
1967, there have been very few prosecutions under the Act and hardly any successful ones 
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against doctors.21 Reverend Jepson’s well-publicised attempt to challenge the supremacy of 
medical decision-making ultimately failed,22 although the litigation may have had some 
impact on the medical approach to abortions based solely on the ground of disability.23 The 
Jepson litigation also highlights the importance of the reporting provisions in the context of 
medical accountability.24 In this regard, it is noteworthy that a recent Parliamentary Inquiry 
has expressed concern at ‘the lack of transparency of decision-making in cases of fetal 
disability’.25 Meanwhile the professional medical bodies have continued to resist any attempt 
to delimit or prescribe the scope of the disability ground.26 
More recently, we have seen media concern over abortions allegedly carried out on the 
basis of gender but reported by doctors as being on lawful grounds.27 The subsequent Care 
Quality Commission Inspections,28 the Department of Health Guidance29 and the decision of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) not to prosecute the individual doctors involved30 
revealed a number of potential issues regarding the bona fides of the decision making and 
notification process, as well as highlighting practical and evidential difficulties in mounting 
any legal challenge to medical decisions in this context. In particular, the absence of any clear 
medical guidance about the law was highlighted by the DPP,31 raising the question why it has 
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taken the medical profession and the Department of Health so long to rectify any ambiguity 
either in the law or in professional understanding of the statutory regime. 
We can also learn from compliance with the reporting requirements laid down by the Act32 
and subsequent regulations.33 These requirements were put in place to provide some measure 
of ex post external scrutiny. There are two aspects to the statutory provisions that require 
separate consideration: (i) the method of recording abortion procedures; and (ii) external 
notification compliance. Both aspects have come under close scrutiny in recent years and the 
findings from the various investigations have revealed some worrying practices and trends. 
For example, the Care Quality Commission, carrying out inspections on a number of NHS 
abortion providers in 2012, found that a number of doctors were pre-signing the abortion 
record form HSA1 (ie before referral and assessment of the pregnant woman)34 as well as 
signing these forms based solely on decisions/assessments made by other practitioners.35 
According to the Department of Health these practices call into ‘question whether doctors 
have acted in accordance with their legal obligations under the Abortion Act.’36 
Under the 1967 Act and the Abortion Regulations 1991, the registered medical practitioner 
who terminates a pregnancy must provide notification of the procedure to the relevant Chief 
Medical Officer (CMO).37 Any person who ‘wilfully contravenes or wilfully fails to comply’ 
with these requirements is liable on summary conviction.38 Although ‘wilfully’ is not 
defined, it seems that the provision has been interpreted as requiring a deliberate failure.39 In 
recent years, both Parliament40 and the Department of Health41 have highlighted notable 
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discrepancies in data reporting (ie differences between the procedures carried out, recorded 
and notified to the CMO). The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) 
were commissioned by the Department of Health to undertake a fact finding mission as a 
result of the discrepancies found in the data reporting. Of particular concern, is RCOG’s 
suggestion that a possible explanation for the under-reporting of abortion procedures may be, 
not so much a ‘wilful failure to comply with the law, but rather a lack of understanding of the 
statutory requirements, which in turn produced a lack of organisation and accountability.’42 
Yet, not only has the medical profession had plenty of time to consider the statutory 
provisions, their own guidance requires doctors to be familiar and up to date with the 
guidelines and law relevant to their work.43 It is also notable that the Department of Health 
chose to utilise the RCOG (who have a representative function for the medical profession) 
rather than a truly independent body to undertake the inquiry. Arguably, a highly deferential 
approach has been adopted by the Department to the medical profession both in terms of the 
process of investigation and the subsequent response to the discovery of the data reporting 
issue. 
Pulling together these threads, we can see two very different perspectives on the 
compromise effected by the 1967 Act and subsequent practice. From one perspective, that of 
‘compromise medicalisation’, the medical profession has failed to confine conduct and 
practice within the terms of the compromise. By contrast, from the perspective of 
‘evolutionary medicalisation’, the medical profession has done pretty well in keeping practice 
in touch with public opinion (which is now much more comfortable with the idea of 
termination)44 and making minimal demands on legislative time.45 In other words, the verdict 
on the last fifty years might well be that the medical profession has failed to discharge the 
responsibilities that it was given by the 1967 compromise but, instead, has done rather well in 
discharging responsibilities that it was not given. 
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Assisted Suicide and ‘Medicalisation’ 
Where secular views dominate end-of-life debates, the principal argument against relaxing 
the legal prohibition against assisted suicide is that there is too great a risk that unwilling and 
vulnerable persons will succumb to pressure to take steps to end their lives. Famously, this 
was the central objection expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the leading US case of 
Washington v Glucksburg;46 it is found, too, in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, where national prohibitions against acts of assistance with suicide are 
protected by a margin of appreciation that gives particular weight to the potential 
vulnerability of the unwilling;47 and the judgments in the Supreme Court hearing of the joint 
appeals of Nicklinson, Lamb, and Martin are full of references to this critical concern.48 
While pro-life supporters will not miss the opportunity to plead this concern, its real 
significance is that it must be taken extremely seriously by any pro-choice advocate—
because, for such an advocate, the choice to be defended has value only so long as it is free 
and informed. Accordingly, if assisted suicide is to be ‘medicalised’, it is imperative that the 
compromise regime puts the condition of free and informed choice firmly in the foreground. 
To be sure, it is also important that the other qualifying conditions are carefully and clearly 
specified; but, without assurance that assistance will be given only where there has been a 
truly hard look at whether the relevant person’s choice is free and informed, no concession 
should be made.49 In this light, what is striking about Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill is 
that it presents a proposal for medicalisation that seeks to give precisely the assurance that 
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those who are vulnerable will not be tricked or coerced or otherwise pressurised into seeking 
assistance that they do not actually wish to have.50 
At the core of the Bill is the requirement that the person who seeks assistance has a clear 
and settled intention to end their life. By restricting permissible assistance to cases where the 
person has been diagnosed as terminally ill and with a life expectation of no more than six 
months,51 the Bill invites the obvious criticism that it misses too many of the target cases 
(such as that of the late Tony Nicklinson);52 but, of course, this restriction increases the 
plausibility of the claim that only those persons who really do want to end their lives will be 
assisted. However, the key assurance in the Bill is given by the provision that requires an 
independent doctor (together with the person’s attending physician) to countersign the 
person’s statutory form declaration but to do so only if satisfied that the person ‘has a clear 
and settled intention to end their own life which has been reached voluntarily, on an informed 
basis and without coercion or duress.’53 This introduces a very particular kind of special 
responsibility for the medical profession.  
When, in July 2014, the Falconer Bill was presented to the House of Lords for its second 
reading, there was a long and empassioned debate, drawing out all shades of opinion. 
However, with a strong signal from the Supreme Court in Nicklinson that a declaration of 
incompatibility is hanging over the legislative prohibition on assisted suicide unless 
Parliament takes a hard look at the issues,54 it was no surprise that it was unanimously agreed 
that the Bill should proceed to the next stage. Moreover, there are significant supportive 
statements in Nicklinson, recognising the good sense of an ex ante inquiry into the state of 
mind of a person who seeks assistance.55  Nevertheless, a compromise of the kind proposed 
by the Falconer Bill presents major challenges for both the criminal justice system and for the 
medical profession. 
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First, if the only lawful acts of assistance are those permitted by the compromise, then 
there is no reason why the criminal justice system should look kindly on doctors who give 
unlawful acts of assistance, albeit on compassionate grounds. We can be quite sure that there 
will be many such cases that fall outside the authorised ambit of assistance but which invite a 
merciful act; and, no doubt, there will be pressure to extend the sphere of permitted acts of 
assistance. Yet, as Brazier and Ost chronicle in their discussion of end-of-life cases, the 
record of the criminal justice system is to find any number of ways of looking kindly on 
doctors (such as Cox56 and Moor57) who, on compassionate grounds, ease the passing of their 
patients.58 The question is whether, following a medicalised compromise, with very strict 
limits, the leading legal actors would see the unlawful acts of doctors in a different light. If 
not, the opponents of the Bill would have a reasonable ground ex ante for concern and 
correction and ex post for complaint. 
Secondly, for the medical profession, the challenge is not quite like that facing doctors 
after the Abortion Act 1967, when terminations needed to be legitimated by reference to the 
particular statutory grounds. It is not a matter of exercising restraint in stretching or 
squeezing the limiting conditions. Rather, the challenge is to prove the doubters wrong: to 
demonstrate that the profession is capable of making robust judgments about whether a 
person who seeks assistance does so on a free and informed basis. Even though free and 
informed consent is the fulcrum of modern medical law, and even though, in their daily 
clinical practice, doctors seemingly make judgments with complete confidence about the free 
and informed decisions of their patients, some might question whether—at any rate, in the 
context of assisted suicide—doctors are the best persons to make such judgments. So, for 
example, in her incisive speech in Nicklinson, Lady Hale says that, while it might not always 
be easy to make such judgments, this is what judges in the Court of Protection or the Family 
Division are sometimes required to do;59 and, moreover, it is something that those judges are 
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required to do in cases that involve ‘sensitive life and death questions’.60 That said, Lady 
Hale does not insist that it is only judges who are equipped for such a task: what matters is 
that the judgment is made by persons who are ‘sufficiently neutral and independent of anyone 
involved with the applicant, and skilled at assessing evidence and competing arguments’.61 If 
the Falconer Bill completes its legislative passage, it will be a surprise if its ‘medicalising’ 
strategy is abandoned—doctors surely must be responsible, at the very least, for confirming 
the terminal diagnosis. However, it will not be a complete surprise if the task of determining 
that the applicant is acting on a free and informed basis is not left to doctors alone.62 
Conclusion 
In the United Kingdom, we have lived for half a century with the medicalisation of abortions; 
by contrast, the medicalisation of assisted suicide is still an unknown quantity. However, the 
lessons of the former are relevant to the debates that currently rage around the latter. 
The key lesson is this. Brazier and Ost’s ‘medicalisation’ implies that the terms of the 
compromise should be strictly observed by the professions—primarily by the doctors but also 
by the key legal actors in the theatre of the criminal justice system. To put it bluntly, the 
medical profession is entrusted with holding the line; and the legal actors are charged with 
ensuring that the doctors discharge their special responsibilities. However, the world does not 
stand still; public opinion, technologies, and economies change; and, in practice, the 
‘medicalisation’ of abortions has proved anything but conservative. In practice, we have had 
‘evolutionary medicalisation’. Viewed retrospectively, this might seem to be no bad thing: it 
has enabled doctors and lawyers to go with the flow of public opinion; and it has meant that 
there is no great gap between the law and public opinion. However, viewed prospectively, at 
the time of the 1967 compromise, these developments would seem to be quite unacceptable: 
the terms of the compromise are not respected and the norms are changed without the 
medical profession being held to account.  
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62  Cf Brownsword, Lewis and Richardson (n 49). Significantly, at the Committee Stage of the Bill, Lord 
Falconer conceded that doctors alone might not be able to deal with all the relevant questions (see the 
Committee Stage of ADB 2014, column 1880-1881). 
 
As the latest attempt to change the law on assisted suicide runs its course, we again face 
the challenge of finding a way of facilitating the compromise (which also means, respecting 
the compromise) but also finding a mechanism ex post for reflecting whatever changes in 
public opinion might take place. The obvious answer is that we need both ‘sunset’ and 
‘sunshine’ so that, after a specified period of years, the compromise legislation is brought to 
Parliament to be openly reviewed and then renewed or revised by positive act.63 Of course, 
for the opponents of the Bill, no guarantee can be given that the terms of the compromise will 
never be changed—in this sense the Falconer Bill might prove to be the thin end of the 
wedge. However, in the interests of transparency, accountability, democracy, and the 
integrity of the compromise, it will not do to leave any adjustment of the law either to 
unauthorised medical discretion or to low visibility governmental ‘guidance’ or codes of 
practice. Any adjustment to the compromise needs the positive imprimatur of Parliament.  
 
 
                                                          
63  Cf the provision in ADB 2014, s 13(4). 
